The Supreme Court of Spain is the highest court for all cases in Spain (private and public). Only human rights cases can be challenged before the Constitutional Court (which also rules on actions in accordance with the Spanish Constitution). In Spain, high courts cannot set binding precedents; [12] However, lower courts usually observe Supreme Court interpretations. In most private law cases, two Supreme Court decisions are required to support an appeal to the Supreme Court. [13] Five articles form the Spanish Supreme Court: in jurisdictions that apply a common law system, the doctrine of stare decisis applies, the principles applied by the Supreme Court in its decisions being binding on all lower courts; It is a question of applying a uniform interpretation and implementation of the law. In civil courts, the doctrine of stare decisis is generally not considered applicable, so that decisions of the Supreme Court are not necessarily binding beyond the immediate case; In practice, however, Supreme Court decisions usually set a very strong precedent or consistent jurisprudence for itself and for all lower courts. What role do the higher courts play in federal systems? What should that role be? And, more importantly, should the courts even play a role in federal systems? For decades, these issues have given rise to heated debates that are unlikely to end. In fact, every time a high-level tribunal makes a decision in a federalism dispute, there are consequences. These consequences may be legislative in nature, allowing or preventing a level of government from pursuing a particular public policy.
They can also be financial in nature, as disputes settled by federalism-related tribunals often involve the allocation of funds between governments. And since adequate funding is crucial in the implementation of most public policies, such decisions ultimately have social consequences. Last but not least, they can also be political: court decisions can calm or exacerbate disputes. In addition, they can promote or hinder unity within federations, especially multinationals, because even formally neutral or technical decisions can take on a symbolic dimension that is often disproportionate to their real importance as a precedent. To say here that a consequence is symbolic does not mean that it does not exist. Because symbols are important, and the perception they have by the public is even more important. In other words, the decision of a higher court in a federalism-related dispute can have a significant impact on the community, and the fact that most citizens cannot feel it directly due to the technical nature and therefore the relative incomprehensibility of such a judgment does not change this conclusion. In Nauru, there is not a single Supreme Court for all kinds of cases. The Supreme Court has ultimate jurisdiction over constitutional matters, but any other case can always be challenged before the Court of Appeal. In addition, a 1976 agreement between Nauru and Australia provides for appeals from the Supreme Court of Nauru to the Supreme Court of Australia in criminal and civil cases, with the notable exception of constitutional cases.
[7] [8] In a very different intellectual tradition and true to his philosophy, which revolves around the concept of political conflicts between friends and enemies,[13] Carl Schmitt argued that courts that would decide existential conflicts in a federation on the basis of their discretion and without stable, general and predetermined norms applicable to the case, would go beyond their judicial role. If such courts saw themselves above the parties to the federal pact, they would in fact become sovereign (when it is supposed to be the federation that is sovereign) and should therefore be characterized as a political force in its own right. In addition, Schmitt noted that a «mixed» decision-making body with equal representation of the federal government and federal units could hardly decide anything unless some «representatives» of those parties did not take into account the wishes of their clients.[14] What is not clear in Schmitt`s view is what he means by «existential conflict.» In the pages that follow his reflections on who should decide such conflicts, he examines Calhoun`s theory of sovereign state rights, in which the federal government is essentially a delegate of federated entities, as well as the case of secession. In the light of such examples, we can assume that conflicts arising from reasonable disputes over the interpretation of the constitutional provisions governing the separation of powers, that is, stable, general and predetermined norms as Schmitt understands them, could not be characterized as «existential», in which case courts arbitrating such conflicts would not usurp the powers of another branch. If this interpretation is correct, the higher courts would have no jurisdiction except to the extent that they have to deal with existential issues that are fairly narrowly defined. It follows, for example, that when the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to rule on a possible secession of Quebec, it should have accepted the argument of the Amicus, which represented the interests of the Government of Quebec, that this issue was purely political and should therefore have rejected jurisdiction.[15] This article discusses the role of the highest courts in federalism disputes. It first sets out the main arguments put forward against the judicial review of such disputes, after which it turns to those who defend the positive contribution of justice to the development of associations. He then proposes a defense of this post, while emphasizing the need to end the zero-sum approach to the relationship between law and politics that seems to inspire many of these assessments. In most countries whose constitutions were modelled on the Soviet Union, the legislature had the power to be the court of last resort. In the People`s Republic of China, the final power of interpretation rests with the Standing Committee of the National People`s Congress (NPC).
This power includes the power to interpret the basic laws of Hong Kong and Macao, the constitutional documents of the two special administrative regions, which are respectively the common law and jurisdiction of the Portuguese legal system. This power is a legislative power and not a judicial power, since an interpretation of the NVKK does not affect cases already decided. In Sri Lanka, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka was established in 1972 after the adoption of a new constitution. The Supreme Court is the highest and last superior court and has the power to exercise its powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Court decisions take precedence over all lower courts. The Sri Lankan legal system is a complex mix of customary and civil law. In some cases, such as the death penalty, the decision may be transmitted to the President of the Republic for clemency. However, if there is a 2/3 majority in parliament for the president (as is currently the case), the powers of the Supreme Court and its judges will be revoked, as they could be removed from office under the Constitution if the president so wishes. Therefore, in such situations, the civil law authorization disappears. The third narrative is another iteration of democracy,[21] but it adds another layer to the argument, namely the inability of the courts to «fulfill the function of constitutional innovation and adaptation.»[22] An example of this is Paul Weiler`s functionalist critique of the Supreme Court of Canada`s jurisprudence on federalism-related disputes, in which he complained that the legitimacy and quality of judicial policy in such disputes is questionable, arguing that the nature of the political relationship underlying a federal system does not need to be resolved by an external third party. even if it seems to be acidic. Moreover, in the absence of meaningful, i.e.
not excessively vague, legal guidelines to resolve a case, the courts should not, in principle, interfere in federal litigation that they consider to be essentially political.[23] The best way to deal with such conflicts is through continuous negotiations and political compromises.[24] A follow-up argument put forward by Patrick Monahan is that because of their inherently political nature, federal disputes are not reducible to their legal dimension; As a result, legal doctrines simply cannot claim to be able to resolve such disputes.[25] Specifically, since federations represent a transaction that was formalized at some point in the history of a political community, it is wrong to assess their development in light of what is perceived to be inherent in federalism. This leads Monahan to argue that disputes related to federalism must be resolved through political processes. Interestingly, he believes that the federal government provides a place where the federal qualities of a society are articulated and protected.[26] Adherence to this belief presupposes the assimilation of the Federation as a whole to the nation, which is intended to be a quasi-individual demo. Once again, the spirit of methodological nationalism shakes its chains. Currently, the Supreme Court of Thailand retains its important status as the country`s highest court.