Second, Hayward argues that it is not useful to consider humanity as a whole as anthropocentric. In fact, many indigenous societies were not anthropocentric, but Western industrial society has become (Sponsel 2014). Hayward also postulates that «it is not useful to criticize humanity in general for the practices practiced by a limited number of people when many others might actually oppose them» (ibid., p. 58). Hayward found that not all the people who benefit from the operating activities of some are enough. If the exclusive benefits of exploitation are not recognized, «anti-anthropocentrists are sensitive to ideological counter-reactions that say that the questioning of these activities is simply misanthropic» (ibid., p. 59). In fact, some scientists have accused environmentalists of blaming all of humanity for biodiversity loss, rather than extremely exploitative elites (Brockington 2002; Chapin, 2004; Holmes, 2013; Fletcher and Büscher, 2016). Given the many documented social ills of inequality, inequality is often considered an important factor in predicting biodiversity loss (Holland et al. 2009; Andrich et al., 2010; Haupt and Lawrence, 2012; Elliott, 2013).
Deep ecologists seek to change the anthropocentric consciousness of humanity, which, as they argue, motivates our ambition to dominate and exploit nature by inviting people to change their idea of nature through an experiential encounter with the fundamental unity of reality. The idealism that characterizes this analysis leads deep ecologists to demand a new «religion» or «spirituality» that teaches a holistic and harmonious representation of the human relationship with nature. Social change, it seems, must be achieved through the missionary work of deep environmentalists with their invitation to spiritual enlightenment. Unlike a Marxist report, for example, which would identify the project of domination and exploitation of nature with the economic goals of a capitalist class, deep ecology asserts that the destruction of the environment results from a tenacious psychological impulse of humanity as a whole. Consequently, the project is not primarily a project of political and economic change, but a project of psychological or spiritual reorientation; Deep ecology attempts to capture ideas of anthropocentrism, production, consumption, etc. to banish from the collective human consciousness. In cognitive psychology, the term anthropocentric thinking has been defined as «the tendency to think of unknown species or biological processes by analogy with humans.» [28] Analog thinking is an attractive thinking strategy, and it can be tempting to apply one`s own experience of being human to other biological systems. [28] For example, since death is generally perceived as undesirable, it may be tempting to form the misconception that death is also undesirable at the cellular level or elsewhere in nature (when in reality programmed cell death is an essential physiological phenomenon and ecosystems also depend on death). [28] Conversely, anthropocentric thinking can also lead humans to subordinate human characteristics to other organisms. For example, it may be tempting to mistakenly assume that an animal that is very different from humans, such as an insect, does not share certain biological characteristics such as reproduction or blood circulation. [28] Kidner, D. (2014).
Why «anthropocentrism» is not anthropocentric. Dialectical Anthropology, 38(1), 465-480. Some anthropocentric philosophers support a so-called cornucopia view, which rejects claims that Earth`s resources are limited or that the uncontrolled growth of the human population will exceed the Earth`s carrying capacity and lead to wars and famines when resources become scarce. Cornucopia philosophers argue that either projections of resource constraints and population growth are exaggerated, or that technology is developed as needed to solve future scarcity problems. In both cases, they see no moral or practical need for legal controls to protect the natural environment or limit its exploitation. If we don`t appeal to everyone, including Slovak transgender models, Mexican drug dealers, Turkish history teachers, Japanese lolitas, American amateur astronomers, etc., can`t we talk about humanity? We disagree. Some groups (for example, commercial loggers) can be held accountable more easily than poor smallholder farmers who are forced to cut down trees to feed their families. In fact, Elliott (2013) argued that the poor are trapped in the devil`s spiral in which they are forced to overuse natural resources, further impoverishing them. But are these poor farmers by definition «innocent» while their actions still result in the destruction of acres of forest? Will they still be «innocent» as they get rich by cutting gold or migrating to a country with high consumption? While it can be easy to blame a Shell CEO for contributing to greenhouse gas emissions, can we say that an average driver who fills their fuel tank is innocent or a little more innocent than the CEO? How to measure innocence? The relevance of this discussion is to reinforce the argument that anthropocentrism is not just about elites, but about an ideology that privileges all people over the rest of nature. This discussion is also important with regard to people who live outside the industrial market system and do not degrade their habitats.
On an individual level, we can speak of «innocents». Nevertheless, any collectivity such as nation-states (even if it is relatively poor) should be held accountable. We accept that in some states some people have a greater responsibility. Perhaps the reason social equality is often mixed with environmental benefits is our desire for altruistic win-win solutions, reflected in the rhetoric of «sustainable development» (WCED 1987) and the three-pronged approach of «People, Planet, and Profit» (Elliott 2013). This approach is rooted in the classical economic assumptions shared by both the political left and the right that economic growth is generally good and, through market self-regulation, will maximize human well-being and spread evenly – so that the «rising tide will lift all boats» (for discussion and criticism of this term, see for example Daly 2014; Washington, D.C., 2015). Nevertheless, one can argue (and should we believe) that while caring for members of one`s own species as a noble manifestation of altruism can be «good» and «natural,» the way one cares for one`s own species to the exclusion or detriment of other species is «wrong.» In fact, the use of the generally accepted definition of anthropocentrism, speciesism, and human chauvinism are fundamental aspects of anthropocentrism, just as what Crist (2012) and Taylor (2013, 2014) have called its most virulent component: human supremacy. The redefinition of the meaning of anthropocentrism to exclude its «bad» side distorts what we are talking about and certainly does not address this approach to human domination. There is a hierarchical definition that lies between the two definitions, which Hayward emphasizes mainly, with «earth» as a whole (according to Aldo Leopold`s «Land Ethic»), including its ecological and evolutionary processes, having the greatest value, followed by communities, species, populations, individuals and genes. All of these levels have value, but a species, for example, has a higher value than an individual – unless one species is extremely rare, in which case the two levels converge in value. Since the early days of environmental ethics, there has been discussion and debate about whether values in nature are anthropocentric (human-centered) or ecocentric (non-human-centered) (e.g., Goodpaster 1978; Rolston, 1983; Taylor, 1983). With the popularization of the concept of ecosystem services (MEA 2005), this debate has spread to the conservation community as a whole (Kareiva and Marvier 2012), leading to calls for inclusive conservation that accepts both forms of assessment (Tallis et al.